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FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS:
WHO PUT THE HOLES IN
“HOLISTIC”?
RODNEY A. SMOLLA
INTRODUCTION
1

In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the Supreme Court
altered, in subtle but important ways, the constitutional principles
governing race-conscious affirmative action programs at American
universities. This Article charts the history of the Fisher litigation,
examines the Supreme Court’s holding and its consequences, explores
the factors that contributed to the deep skepticism held by a majority
of the Justices on the Supreme Court to “holistic” race-conscious
admissions programs, and reflects on the future of holistic admissions
in American higher education.
It may be tempting to dismiss Fisher as a “non-event” that avoided
any genuine examination of the principles governing affirmative
2
action in higher education, effectively maintaining the status quo.
Such a minimalist reading of Fisher, however, would be a mistake.
Fisher did alter the law, by eliminating the substantial deference the
Supreme Court had previously been willing to extend to university
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1. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2. On September 27, 2013, the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice and the United States Department of Education issued a letter to American college and
university presidents providing “guidance” on Fisher that took the position that Fisher did not
alter existing law. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to College and
Univ. Presidents (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201309.html. Specifically, the letter notes that the Supreme Court
affirmed that “colleges and universities have a compelling interest in achieving the educational
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body and can lawfully pursue
that interest in their admissions programs,” and that the educational benefits of diversity
recognized by the Court “include cross-racial understanding and dialogue, the reduction of
racial isolation, and the breaking down of racial stereotypes.” Id.
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educators on whether race-conscious programs are necessary to
achieve the benefits of a diverse student body. Fisher replaces that
deference with a rigorous rendition of strict scrutiny equal protection
review that will prove, in future cases, to exert a potent presumption
against the validity of race-conscious affirmative action programs. The
Supreme Court’s new skepticism is fueled by a deep suspicion on the
part of a majority of the current Justices that the “holistic” approach
to affirmative action admissions does not live up to its advertising.
Fisher portends significant future restrictions on race-conscious
affirmative action admissions programs—perhaps their full demise.
American universities are themselves complicit in this demise, for
having failed in the eyes of a majority of the Justices to convincingly
“walk the walk” on holistic admissions, despite an exuberant tendency
to “talk the talk.”
Although the legal battles in Fisher, and in other challenges to
affirmative action, will continue to play out in courts, those of us in
higher education will do well to rethink our own commitments to
genuinely holistic approaches to admissions, entirely aside from what
the courts finally tell us we may or may not do. Authentically holistic
admissions programs that treat students as more than mere numbers
hold great promise for the nation, and for higher education. Yet, the
Fisher litigation teaches that federal courts—including a majority of
the Justices on the Supreme Court—may not be willing to accept, as a
matter of deferential good faith, the claim by those in higher
education that approaches to holistic admissions are, “on the street,”
quite as idealistically holistic as advertised. Perhaps that is not such a
bad thing.
I. THE LEGAL BACKDROP TO THE FISHER LITIGATION
Understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher requires
some historical context. This Part discusses the Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence leading up to Fisher and highlights the
incremental development of race-conscious admissions policies by
state universities in Texas.
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A. Bakke
3

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was a challenge to
the affirmative action admissions program of the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis, in which sixteen admissions
seats at the Medical School were reserved for members of minority
4
groups. The Supreme Court was sharply divided in the case, with six
Justices issuing separate opinions, none of which commanded more
than four votes. Justice Lewis Powell was the man in the middle. His
opinion controlled the outcome, and largely set the stage for the next
three decades of affirmative action law and policy in American higher
5
education.
Justice Powell’s fateful opinion in Bakke rejected a two-tiered
approach to racial classifications, which would have distinguished
6
between benign and invidious classifications. Powell insisted instead
that all racial classifications be measured under the strict scrutiny test,
7
though he at times used the phrase “most exacting scrutiny.” Powell
thereby rejected the view that the Constitution was colorblind and
that absolutely all racial classifications were invalid, without
8
exception.
The Medical School proffered four justifications for its affirmative
action program: (1) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession”; (2) “countering the effects of societal discrimination”; (3)
“increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved”; and (4) “obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student

3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. Id. at 277–79.
5. Id. at 269; see also Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a
Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21, 23 (1979); John Jeffries, Bakke Revisted, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10
(2003) (“Powell’s fifth vote rested on a narrower rationale and a more demanding standard of
review. Even though no one shared Powell's position, it nevertheless ended up defining the kind
of affirmative action that a majority of the Court was prepared to uphold.”).
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294–95 (“It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal
protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of
protection greater than that accorded others. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination due to a two-class theory . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
7. Id. at 300.
8. Id. at 272 (“I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the
portion of the court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in
its admissions process must be reversed.”).
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9

body.” Justice Powell rejected the first three justifications. He did
accept as a constitutionally permissible “compelling interest,”
however, the Medical School’s pursuit of educational benefits, formal
10
and informal, that flow from a more diverse student body. Powell
argued that an affirmative action program could pass constitutional
muster if it used race as a flexible “plus factor” in admissions,
employed a broad definition of diversity that included characteristics
other than race, and avoided strict quotas or set-asides of the sort
11
utilized by the Medical School.
Powell concluded that “it is not too much to say that the nation’s
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
12
peoples.” Arguing that the pursuit of a diverse student body was of
“paramount importance” to the fulfillment of the university’s
13
mission, Powell stated that “even at the graduate level, our tradition
and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of
14
diversity is substantial.” Even so, Powell held that in setting aside a
specific number of minority seats, the Medical School violated the
Equal Protection Clause:
[T]he state interest that would justify consideration of race or
ethnic background . . . is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity,
in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the
remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students.
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.
Petitioner’s special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic
diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine
15
diversity.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 312–21.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
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Holding up the Harvard admissions program as a foil, Justice
Powell asserted that at Harvard, “ethnic background may be deemed
a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
16
seats.” Although Justice Powell did not use the word “holistic” in his
opinion, universities and subsequent judicial opinions would come to
use the term as shorthand for the approach Justice Powell endorsed.
B. Hopwood and the Texas Top Ten Percent Law
17

In Hopwood v. Texas, decided in 1996, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the University of Texas Law School’s race18
conscious admissions program was unconstitutional. Hopwood was a
bold decision for its time. In the mid-1990s most American
universities, public and private, had been using the holistic approach
to race-conscious admissions approved by Justice Powell in Bakke.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit struck down the Texas Law School
admissions program in an unflinching decision that held, first, that
Justice Powell’s solo opinion was simply the vote of one Justice and
19
not binding as precedent, and second, that it was not sound
20
constitutional law. Most pointedly, the Fifth Circuit flatly rejected
the argument that the pursuit of a diverse student body qualified as a
compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the race21
conscious admissions program under strict scrutiny. Though
technically binding only on the Texas Law School, Hopwood was
interpreted by the Texas Attorney General as effectively banning
race-conscious admissions programs in all of the state’s public
universities and colleges, at all levels of higher education.
Hopwood had a short shelf life. The Texas state legislature dealt
the first blow by crafting an end-run around the decision in 1997 by

16. Id. at 317.
17. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. Id. at 955, 962.
19. Id. at 944 (“[A]ny consideration of race . . . for the purpose of achieving a diverse
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell’s
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority
of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”).
20. Id. at 944–48 (concluding that “the use of race to achieve a diverse student body,
[even] as a proxy for permissible characteristics, simply cannot be a state interest compelling
enough to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny”).
21. Id. at 945 (“In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than
Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a
compelling justification for governmental race-based discrimination.”).
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22

passing “The Top Ten Percent Law.” This statute provided that any
student finishing in the top ten percent of his or her high school class
23
must be granted automatic admission to any Texas state university.
Although the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hopwood remained the
governing law in Texas, the impact of Hopwood was muted by the
24
legislative enactment.
The Top Ten Percent Law was in a curious sense both race-neutral
and race-based. On its surface it was entirely race-neutral, creating a
reward for any student finishing in the top ten percent of his or her
class. Yet race was indisputably the animating purpose behind the
25
law. In operation it served, at least modestly, to enhance diversity at
Texas public universities (including the University of Texas at Austin),
because some Texas high schools were predominantly populated by
26
students of only one race. The Rio Grande Valley, for example, is
overwhelmingly Hispanic, and certain urban areas in large cities such
27
as Dallas and Houston are overwhelmingly African-American.
Given that Texas contained a share of high schools that were almost
entirely African-American, Hispanic, or Caucasian, the basic math of
the Top Ten Percent Law was quite simple. In offering automatic
admission to top-ten-percent students from each high school in the
state, the diversity in the top ten percent pool, and by extension, the
diversity in the entering college class at the University of Texas at
Austin, would be enhanced. With some irony, the Top Ten Percent
Law promoted diversity precisely because so much of the State of
28
Texas was still de facto segregated.

22. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2013).
23. Id. § 51.803(a).
24. See Gerald Torres, “Examining Diversity” in Education: Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v.
Bollinger: View from a Limestone Edge, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1600–01 (2003) (“The
University of Texas has created a more racially, geographically, and socioeconomically diverse
class, and it has expanded the number of feeder high schools yielding an academically successful
student body.”).
25. See Brief for the Respondent at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345) (“An acknowledged purpose of the law was to increase minority admissions
given the loss of race-conscious admissions.” (citation omitted)).
26. Texas public high schools are highly segregated in certain regions of the state. The
predominance of public schools dominated by students from one racial group reflects the longstanding segregated housing patterns that are common throughout the United States. See
generally Rodney Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the
1980s, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); Rodney Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The
Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight,
1981 DUKE L.J. 891, 892 n.1 (1981).
27. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 25, at 8.
28. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation,
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C. Grutter and Gratz
The second blow to Hopwood was judicial. In 2003, the Supreme
29
Court rendered its bookend decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and
30
Gratz v. Bollinger. In Grutter, the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
31
admissions program. Justice O’Connor, writing for a five-Justice
majority (comprised of Justices O’Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens,
and Souter), embraced Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke, sustaining
as constitutionally legitimate the Michigan Law School’s aspiration to
32
enroll a “critical mass” of minority students. The Michigan Law
School’s admission committee focused on a combination of
traditional indicia of academic ability, such as LSAT scores and
undergraduate GPA, and a more flexible assessment of the applicant’s
33
talents, experiences, and potential. The process involved weighing
both “hard data” and “soft variables,” which included “the enthusiasm
of the recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the
quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of
34
undergraduate course selection.”
In so doing, the Michigan Law School sought to achieve a “mix of
students with varying backgrounds and experiences who [could]
35
respect and learn from one another.” It aspired to “achieve diversity
which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make
36
a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” The language of
the Michigan Law School’s policy included both a broad conception
of diversity not limited to race and ethnicity, and a special emphasis
37
on racial and ethnic diversity. The policy thus acknowledged “many
possible bases for diversity admissions,” and allowed substantial
Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1817–19 (2004).
29. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
31. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44.
32. Id. at 323–35.
33. Id. at 314.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 314. In addition, the Michigan Law School considered letters of
recommendation, a personal statement, and an essay describing what the applicant could
contribute to life and diversity at the school. Id. at 315.
36. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 315–16 (“The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School's longstanding
commitment to . . . ‘racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students
from groups which have been historically discriminated against, . . . who without this
commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.’” (citation
omitted)).

SMOLLA 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

38

2/15/2014 2:49 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9

weight to be given in the admissions process to a wide array of
38
experiences and backgrounds. Yet at the same time, the policy
reaffirmed and entrenched the Michigan Law School’s commitment
to the enrollment of a “critical mass” of racial or ethnic minority
39
students.
Whereas the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood had argued that the
diversity rationale embraced by Powell in Bakke had garnered only
40
his one vote, now there were five votes. The majority in Grutter held
that the Michigan Law School’s compelling interest in creating a
diverse student body was being pursued in a constitutionally
allowable manner. The admissions regime met strict scrutiny’s test of
narrow tailoring—no quotas or set-asides were used, every student’s
file was considered holistically and individually, and race was not an
exclusive factor but simply one ingredient in a complex
41
bouillabaisse.
Conversely, the Court in Gratz struck down the University of
42
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program. Although the
undergraduate program also sought a diverse student body, the
admissions program for undergraduates appeared more mechanistic
than holistic. Michigan’s undergraduate admissions system used a
selection method under which every applicant from an “underrepresented” racial or ethnic minority group was automatically
awarded twenty points of the one hundred needed to guarantee
43
admission, rendering the program dangerously close to the sort of
38. Id. at 316.
39. Id.
40. Commentators have often stressed the linkage between the Court’s opinion in Grutter
and Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. See Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker,
Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 541, 548 (2003) (“Justice O'Connor quoted extensively from Justice Powell a
whopping sixteen times. To endorse and cite [Bakke] and suggest independent agreement with
it is one thing; to cannibalize all its key formulations suggests that the case is doing a great deal
of the work.”); Susan Low Bloch, Looking Ahead: The Future of Affirmative Action, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 1507, 1513 (2003) (stating that the Court in Grutter “made the very significant decision
that the University's desire to achieve diversity in its student body was in fact a compelling
governmental interest, relying heavily on the reasoning of Justice Powell's lone opinion in
Bakke”); Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1589, 1590–91 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices,
Not Theory, Determine Constitutional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 369 (2003) (“The bottom line
is that the Court adhered to the position articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Bakke a quarter
century ago: Diversity is a compelling interest in education and universities may use race as a
factor to ensure diversity, but quotas or numerical quantification of benefits is impermissible.”).
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–44.
42. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003).
43. Id. at 255 (“Under this new system, applicants could receive points for
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44

quota disapproved by Justice Powell in Bakke. The undergraduate
admissions program appeared to favor race for the sake of race alone,
at least to the extent that in a quantifiable sense, points were explicitly
45
awarded for membership in certain racial groups.
II. ABIGAIL FISHER’S SUIT AGAINST THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
In 2008, Abigail Fisher sued the University of Texas on the ground
that she was denied undergraduate admission because she was white.
She claimed that the University’s race-conscious admissions program
46
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fisher was in the top twelve percent of her high school class, and
47
thus could not benefit from Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law. But Fisher
wanted to attend the University of Texas, so she applied for admission
48
for one of the remaining seats in the freshman class. That year,
approximately eighty-one percent of the incoming class would be
49
filled by the system mandated by the Top Ten Percent Law. Thus,
nineteen percent of the admission slots in the entering class were left
open for students admitted outside the Ten Percent Law regime;
50
Fisher could only compete for one of these remaining slots. To
determine admissions for the remaining slots, the University
underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at a high school
with a predominantly underrepresented minority population, or underrepresentation in the unit
to which the student was applying . . . .”).
44. Interestingly, seven Justices saw no meaningful difference between the admissions
policies at issue in Grutter and Gratz. Only Justices O’Connor and Breyer were in the majority
in both cases. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221,
244 n.104 (2004); cf. Ian Ayres & Sidney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (arguing that the Gratz policy was actually
more narrowly tailored than the policy in Grutter).
45. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274–75.
46. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
47. See Second Amended Complaint at 3, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (No. 1:08-cv-00263SS) (“At the time of her application to UT Austin, Ms. Fisher was ranked 82 out of 674 students
in her graduating class. Thus, Ms. Fisher was ranked in approximately the top 12 percent of her
class . . . .”).
48. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (noting that Fisher
applied to the University in 2008 and was rejected).
49. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
50. See id. at 596 (“The [Academic Index/Personal Achievement Indices] system is used to
make admission decisions as to . . . non-Top Ten Percent Texas resident applicants . . . .”). The
University’s individual academic programs admit students using the AI/API standards which
combine two metrics: the Academic Index (AI), a combination of (1) high school GPA, (2)
completion of the University’s required high school curriculum, (3) student’s extent of
exceeding that curriculum, and (4) SAT Score; and the Personal Achievement Indices,
reflecting scores on two essays and a “personal achievement score, representing a holistic
evaluation of the applicant’s entire file.” Id.
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incorporated race-conscious affirmative action policies, claiming to
employ a holistic approach that included race as one “plus factor” in
51
admissions, of the sort approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.
The manner in which Fisher framed her claim proved to be
extremely important. She could have launched a frontal assault on
52
Grutter, inviting the Supreme Court to repudiate it. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter had suggested, after all, that the
holding might not always be valid: “We expect that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
53
interest approved today.” Fisher might have tried to persuade the
Court that twenty-five years should be reduced to ten, and that the
experiment in Texas, with its Top Ten Percent Law, demonstrated that
viable race-neutral alternatives could substitute for holistic raceconscious affirmative action. The gamble with such a strategy would
have been that with Justice O’Connor’s departure from the Court,
there were now five votes poised to end affirmative action: Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
Fisher, however, chose a more constrained litigation strategy.
Rather than staking her claim on the overruling of Grutter, she argued
that the Texas admissions program violated the Equal Protection
54
Clause even if Grutter remained good law. In essence, Fisher argued
that because the Top Ten Percent Law already increased racial
diversity at Texas, the University could not engage in what was akin to
piling on—seeking yet additional diversity in rounding out the profile
55
of the student body.

51. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (noting the University’s method of employing race as a
“plus” factor in the Personal Achievement Index is the “program at issue here”).
52. Under this approach, she would have almost certainly lost in the district court and
court of appeals, for those lower courts would have been without authority to disobey the
standing law of the land. Yet she might still have framed her case in a manner that built a record
and positioned her claim to urge the Supreme Court to overrule Grutter.
53. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
54. See Brief for the Petitioner at 26–27, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345) (arguing that Grutter permits race to be used as a factor to achieve diversity
but that the University’s asserted interests for considering race do not relate to the internal
university experience, and are thus outside the scope permitted by Grutter).
55. Id. at 34 (“With the Top 10% Law in operation then, UT was one of the most diverse
public universities in the nation . . . . Neither Grutter nor any of this Court's other decisions
authorizes ‘gratuitous racial preferences’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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For its part, Texas argued that the Top Ten Percent Law did not
achieve sufficient diversity, either quantitatively or qualitatively, to
satisfy its compelling interest in achieving a more diverse student
56
body. Texas also argued that the admissions system it used was
57
precisely what the Supreme Court had already approved in Grutter.
If Fisher was not challenging the ruling in Grutter, Texas reasoned,
and if Texas was simply following Grutter’s roadmap, then it had done
58
nothing unconstitutional.
III. THE ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
Oral arguments in the Supreme Court are frequently parsed in
news reports on the day or two after they take place. Typically,
however, once a decision in a case is handed down, it is the decision
itself, and not the briefs or oral arguments that preceded it, that is
analyzed and examined. Thus, the exercise that follows is “extra-legal”
in that it is offered for insight, not precedent. The oral argument in
Fisher is worth parsing in some detail, for what it reveals about the
majority opinion that later emerged, and for what it may tell us about
the future of affirmative action after Fisher.
Two phrases rose to special prominence during the oral argument
in Fisher. The first was the term “critical mass” of minority students,
the achievement of which came as a pre-approved goal for universities
59
under Gutter. The second was the term “holistic admissions,” the
shorthand commonly employed to describe the means approved in
60
Grutter for the attainment of a critical mass. The oral argument in
56. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 9 (“Even with the top 10% law
and UT's race-neutral diversity initiatives, African-American and Hispanic enrollment at best
remained stagnant compared to the pre-Hopwood period.”).
57. Id. at 11 (“The 2004 Proposal [challenged here] embraced the diversity interest that
this Court found compelling in Grutter . . . .”).
58. Id. at 38 (“UT has carefully followed this Court's teachings [in Grutter] to ensure that
race is only one factor among many . . . . In petitioner's view, those instructions were not a road
map to the safe harbor recognized by Bakke and Grutter, but a trap leading to
unconstitutionality.”).
59. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Fisher Oral Argument] (Bert Rein, counsel for
Fisher) (“In order to satisfy Grutter, you first have to say that you are not just using race
gratuitously, but it is in the interest of producing a critical mass of otherwise underrepresented
students. . . . [T]he first question is, absent the use of race, would we be generating a critical
mass.”).
60. See, e.g., id. at 65 (Donald Verrilli, Solicitor General) (“There's no quota. Everyone
competes against everyone else. Race is not a mechanical automatic factor. It's an holistic
individualized consideration. And because of the way the process is structured, they do not
monitor the racial composition on an ongoing basis.”).
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Fisher, on its face, appeared to be an exercise in exploring whether the
University of Texas admissions regime was faithful to those concepts
within the confines of Grutter. Yet there was brightly visible an
undercurrent of deep cynicism—so brightly visible as to not really be
fairly called “beneath the surface” of the questions of the most
61
skeptical Justices —regarding the practical, moral, and legal
legitimacy of the terms themselves.
The anti-affirmative action Justices thus challenged the University
of Texas and its defenders to articulate how and when the University
would know that a “critical mass” of minority students had been
62
enrolled. The oral argument is telling in its lack of any clear and crisp
answer. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli gave the question a valiant
try. In an elegant soliloquy, General Verrilli argued that America’s
national “strength comes from people of different races, different
creeds, different cultures, uniting in a commitment to freedom, and to
63
more a perfect union.” This statement conjured the fervor of
affirmative action’s most passionate proponents, in arguing that
meaningful diversity—diversity that will genuinely enrich the
educational experience of students at American universities, exposing
students to a rainbow tapestry of fellow students from diverse races,
ethnic groups, religions, cultures, nations, or life experiences—
necessitates that there be a sufficient representation of each group in
the mix to make the cross-exposure meaningful. To these arguments,
Texas and its supporting amici also argued that a critical mass of
representation is required to ward off the pernicious side-effects of
64
tokenism and isolation.
61. I count as the most openly skeptical Justices Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas was, as is his custom, quiet during the oral
argument, though his past writings on affirmative action leave no doubt that he is a passionate
opponent of affirmative action—as affirmed in his concurring opinion in Fisher itself, in which
he again declared that he would overrule Grutter. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
62. See, e.g., Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 20 (Alito, J.) (“Mr. Rein, do you
understand what the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a critical mass? Because I
don’t.”).
63. Id. at 72.
64. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 41 (“[UT] based its determination
that UT had not yet reached a critical mass in 2004 on hard data on minority admissions,
enrollment and racial isolation at UT.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Society of American Law
Teachers in Support of Respondents at 11, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“Campus
diversity permits more engaging and eye-opening classroom discussions, breaks down
stereotypes, and prepares students to be leaders in an increasingly globalized and diverse
business world. A diverse classroom also prevents racial isolation and tokenism, which can
hinder learning environments for all students.”).
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A palpable suspicion on the part of the skeptical Justices
permeated the oral argument, however, as those Justices asked
questions manifestly distrustful of both the conceptual coherence and
65
practical execution of the goals of the University. Fisher’s advocate,
Bert Rein, repeatedly argued that the University had abdicated its
threshold responsibility under Grutter to define or establish a working
66
target for obtaining a critical mass of minority students. Chief Justice
Roberts questioned how the Supreme Court was supposed to perform
its task of deciding whether the University’s pursuit of a critical mass
of minority students was constitutional if the University would not or
could not explain how it would know when it achieved a critical
67
mass.
Additionally, the critical Justices were openly antagonistic to the
University’s approach to gathering data about the profile of its
student body. The University relied entirely on an applicant’s self68
description of racial or ethnic identity. Chief Justice Roberts was
plainly disturbed by the lack of any objective standard to determine
whether a student was appropriately classified. “I need to figure out
69
exactly what these numbers mean,” the Chief Justice stated. “Should
someone who is one-quarter Hispanic check the Hispanic box or
70
some different box?” Pressing the point, the Chief Justice asked if it
would violate the University’s honor code for someone who is one71
eighth Hispanic to check the Hispanic box. Justice Scalia pushed the
72
fraction to 1/32nd. The University’s counsel ultimately conceded that
the University made no effort to verify the declared racial
identification of students, but sought refuge in the fact that it was not
65. See, e.g., Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 46 (Roberts, C.J.) (“I understand my
job, under our precedents, to determine if your use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling
interest. The compelling interest you identify is attaining a critical mass of minority students at
the University of Texas, but you won't tell me what the critical mass is.”).
66. Id. at 13. Bert Rein made this point repeatedly in his argument on Fisher’s behalf,
including to questions posed by Justices Sotomayor and Scalia. See id. (Bert Rein, counsel for
Fisher) (“[T]here was no effort in this case to establish even a working target for critical mass. . .
. They just used words and they said we've got to do more. So they never answered the
predicate question which Grutter asks: Absent the use of race, can we generate a critical
mass?”).
67. Id. at 32 (Roberts, C.J.) (“So how are we supposed to tell whether this plan is narrowly
tailored to that goal?”).
68. Id. at 32–34.
69. Id. at 32.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id. at 35 (Scalia, J.) (“[D]id they require everybody to check a box or they have
somebody figure out, oh, this person looks 1/32nd Hispanic, and that's enough?”).
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alone. According to the University’s counsel, “no college in America,”
73
including the Ivy Leagues and the Little Ivy Leagues, engaged in
74
such verification.
The oral argument grew particularly poignant when the
questioning turned to differences in the approach the University took
toward students from different ethnic groups, most notably students
of Asian descent. Fisher argued that the University effectively
discriminated against Asian Americans, who did not receive any plus
points for being members of an ethnic minority. The University
argued that it did not need to prime the pump to enroll more students
75
of Asian descent, as their numbers were already robust. Riding this
point, Justice Alito asked the lawyer for the University, “How do you
76
justify lumping together all Asian Americans?” Did the University
believe, Justice Alito asked, that it had a critical mass of Filipino
77
78
Americans? Cambodian Americans?
The questions asked by the skeptical Justices plainly exposed their
concern that “critical mass” was largely a euphemism invoked to
disguise what was really going on: the use of a numbers-driven quasiquota in which the actual goal, though never explicitly articulated, was
to achieve a student body that roughly mirrored the demographics of
the State of Texas. Such a regime would plainly be forbidden—it
would constitute the very pursuit of race for the sake of race alone
that Justice Powell had rejected as constitutionally impermissible in
79
Bakke.
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id. Additionally, Justice Scalia, exploring the granular texture of the critical mass
concept, asked whether the critical mass determination should be made in reference to the
“school at large,” or rather “class by class.” Id. at 34. The University’s counsel stated that the
University only asserted a compelling interest in the diversity of its student body as a whole, and
not classroom by classroom. Id.
75. See id. at 29 (Bert Rein, counsel for Fisher) (“They say, we don't worry about Asians,
there are a lot of Asians, it's a demographic measure, which is a forbidden measure. They are in
excess of their share of the Texas population.”).
76. Id. at 52.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Attaining diversity for its own sake is a nonstarter. As even Grutter recognized,
the pursuit of diversity as an end is nothing more than impermissible ‘racial balancing.’”). The
University insisted that it had not adopted such a simplistic system designed to achieve racial
balance, notwithstanding questions asking whether this was really so. Fisher Oral Argument,
supra note 59, at 39–40 (Alito, J.) (“Is the critical mass for the University of Texas dependent on
the breakdown of the population of Texas?”). Justice Alito, for example, asked pointedly
whether the definition of critical mass in Texas would be different from the definition in
neighboring New Mexico: “But would 3 percent be enough in New Mexico, your bordering
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The most telling moment in the oral argument surrounded a
hypothetical. Counsel for the University was drawing a comparison
between the results obtained under the Top Ten Percent Law, in which
minority students “tend to come from segregated, racially-identifiable
80
schools,” and the characteristics of minority students who are
81
admitted under the holistic approach to admissions. In its principal
brief, the University went to great lengths to explain how the minority
students admitted under holistic review are generally more
academically qualified than the minority students admitted under the
Top Ten Percent Law:
African-American and Hispanic students admitted through
holistic review are, on average, more likely than their top 10%
counterparts to have attended an integrated high school; are less
likely to be the first in their families to attend college; tend to have
more varied socioeconomic backgrounds; and, on average, have
82
higher SAT scores than their top-10% counterparts.

These more qualified students, the University argued, have great
potential to serve as a “bridge” for promoting cross-racial
understanding, which in turn might help break down racial
stereotypes—stereotypes that the University argued are often
83
reinforced by the results achieved under the Top Ten Percent Law.
The University in its brief then posed a hypothetical:
The African-American or Hispanic child of successful
professionals in Dallas who has strong SAT scores and has
demonstrated leadership ability in extracurricular activities but
falls in the second decile of his or her high school class (or attends
an elite private school that does not rank) cannot be admitted
under the top 10% law. Petitioner’s position would forbid UT from
considering such a student’s race in holistic review as well, even
though the admission of such a student could help dispel
stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced by
84
the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.

This hypothetical drew fire in the oral argument. Should such an
applicant be the beneficiary of racial “plus points” in the admissions
process? What all the Justices surely knew was that American
state, where the African American population is around 2 percent?” Id. at 48.
80. Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 42.
81. Id.
82. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 33–34.
83. Id. at 34.
84. Id.
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universities typically perceive such an applicant as highly desirable.
The brief argued such students tend to be heavily recruited because
they are often academically strong students who tend to promote
cross-racial understanding and break down stereotypes. Even so, there
is a more cynical narrative: that admission of such students improves
both a university’s diversity and academic profiles, enhancing its
rankings and prestige. When the “privileged Dallas student”
hypothetical came up in the oral argument, Justice Alito lamented: “I
thought that the whole purpose of affirmative action was to help
85
students who come from underprivileged backgrounds.” The
University, Justice Alito complained, was making the claim that the
Top Ten Percent Law did not admit enough African-American or
Hispanic students from privileged backgrounds, an argument that
86
Justice Alito found deeply troubling.
When counsel for the University responded that the Court had
approved this practice in Grutter and in Bakke, Justice Kennedy, who
would emerge as the author of the Fisher majority opinion, made a
statement that proved highly prescient: “So what you’re saying is that
87
what counts is race above all.” Riding over the advocate’s denial,
Justice Kennedy insisted that this was the necessary conclusion to be
drawn from Texas’s answer to Justice Alito’s questions. “You want
underprivileged of a certain race and privileged of a certain race,”
88
Kennedy observed. “So that’s race.”
VI. A CLOSE ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
FISHER
A. Fisher’s Three Key Questions
At least as measured by the vote, Fisher was a surprise to many.
The decision was seven–to–one, with only Justice Ginsburg
89
dissenting. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and
85. Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 43.
86. Id. at 44 (Alito, J.) (questioning whether a minority applicant, whose parents may both
have graduate degrees and earn income that puts the family in the top one percent of earners in
the country, “deserve[s] a leg-up against . . . an Asian or a white applicant whose parents are
absolutely average in terms of education and income”).
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id.
89. Because Justice Kagan had participated in earlier stages in the litigation while serving
as Solicitor General in the early years of the administration of President Obama, she recused
herself from the case in the Supreme Court.
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90

Sotomayor. Justices Scalia and Thomas, though joining in the
91
opinion of Justice Kennedy, also wrote concurring opinions.
To clearly define what Fisher portends, it is useful to tease out the
three critical and distinct issues addressed in the case. First, in
applying the compelling governmental interest requirement of the
first prong of the strict scrutiny test, may universities continue to rely
on the goal of “diversity,” defined to include overt consideration of
92
race and ethnicity, as a compelling governmental interest? Second, in
applying the narrow tailoring requirement of the second prong of
strict scrutiny, what level of deference must courts show to a
university’s decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions program, as
93
opposed to a race-neutral alternative? Third, in applying the narrow
tailoring requirement of the second prong of strict scrutiny, what level
of deference must courts show to a university’s decisions regarding
the specific elements of its particular race-conscious admissions
94
program? Each question will be explored in turn.
1. The Status of “Diversity” as a Compelling Interest
The answer to the first of the three questions posed above—
whether universities may continue to rely on “diversity,” defined to
include race and ethnicity, as a compelling governmental interest—is:
“Yes, but only for the time being, and stay tuned for further
developments.” The Court in Fisher accepted diversity as a compelling
interest only because Fisher chose not to frontally assault this aspect
95
of Grutter. But there is language in Fisher clearly signaling the
Court’s willingness to revisit this issue, and also clearly signaling the
Court’s suspicion that the invocation of diversity by American
universities may be a sleight-of-hand, a euphemism disguising what
may really be going on—the pursuit of the unconstitutional goal of

90. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013).
91. Id. at 2422.
92. See id. at 2419 (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the
principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity.”).
93. See id at 2419–20 (recognizing, on the one hand, that the University’s academic
judgment identifying diversity as “integral to its mission” warrants some judicial deference, but
cautioning, on the other hand, that a court must engage in “a careful judicial inquiry into
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications”).
94. Id. at 2420 (stating that the University receives no deference with respect to the
question of whether “the means chosen to achieve diversity are narrowly tailored to [the] goal
[of diversity in the student body]”).
95. See id. at 2419 (“[T]he parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of
Grutter’s holding.”).
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96

racial balancing for its own sake.
Justice Kennedy’s seven-Justice majority opinion, as well as the
concurrences of Justices Scalia and Thomas, revealed the significance
of Fisher’s strategic decision to refrain from asking the Supreme
Court to overrule Grutter. Justice Scalia’s short concurrence noted
that though he continued to adhere to the views he expressed in
Grutter, that a university’s interest in the educational benefits of
diversity could not justify racial preferences in university admissions,
Fisher had not asked the Court to overrule Grutter. In that posture, he
97
fully joined the majority opinion. Justice Thomas, in a much longer
and more impassioned concurrence, also openly declared that he
98
would vote to overrule Grutter.
If Fisher’s decision not to challenge Grutter took the Court off the
hook, however, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion contained many
signals as to where the Court would likely go if it were on the hook. In
roundly criticizing the good faith standard invoked by the Fifth
99
Circuit, the Fisher Court conspicuously invoked the long line of
equal protection cases treating racial classifications as inherently
100
odious and suspect. Moreover, despite the fact that Fisher’s lawyers

96. The Court relied on two cases to suggest that diversity as a justification for the use of
race in college admissions remains suspect. It began by emphasizing that a university’s good
faith in using race as a factor in admissions does not operate as a shield, because “the mere
recitation of a benign or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no
weight.” Id. at 2421 (quoting City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that “[t]he analysis and level of scrutiny applied to
determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective
appears acceptable. . . . While the validity and importance of the objective may affect the
outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change.” Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would overrule Grutter and hold that the
University’s admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause because the University
has not put forward a compelling interest that could possibly justify racial discrimination.”).
99. The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit because “rather than perform this searching
examination, [it] held petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] decision to
reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’” Id. at 2420 (majority
opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236
(5th Cir. 2011)). “These expressions of the controlling standard are at odds with Grutter’s
command that all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.” Id. at 2421 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 2419 (“[A]dditional guidance may be found in the Court's broader equal
protection jurisprudence which applies in this context. ‘Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people,’ . . . and therefore ‘are
contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect[]’ . . . .” (quoting Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954))). That the Court cited to
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did not seek an outright overruling of the Bakke/Grutter diversity
rationale, there were hints in Justice Kennedy’s opinion that
continued adherence to that rationale could be very much in play.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion included this obscure sentence: “We take
101
those cases as given for purposes of deciding this case.” If this was
not damning by faint praise, it was at the least signaling by faint
phrase. Note the careful wording: The Court did not say “we reaffirm
those cases.” Rather, the Court chose a more cramped, cryptic
wording, stating that it would simply “take” the cases “as given for the
purposes of deciding this case,” leaving open the possibility that the
Court would not take those cases as given in deciding future cases.
2. The Status of Deference on Issues of Narrow Tailoring
The appropriate role of deference to the educational judgments of
universities was in play on two levels in Fisher. The more important
issue was whether to defer to universities on the threshold question of
102
whether race-conscious admissions practices are necessary at all.
The Fisher Court’s response to this question is not entirely plain. The
soundest reading of Fisher, in my view, is that the Court no longer
approves of deference to universities on any aspect of the application
of the strict scrutiny test to race-conscious affirmative action
programs, including the threshold question of whether they are
necessary at all.
This question, though it falls under the rubric of the narrow
tailoring requirement, is of course very closely connected to the
question of whether the pursuit of diversity should remain cognizable
as a compelling governmental interest. Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law
raised the possibility, however, that even if the pursuit of diversity is
not decommissioned as a compelling interest, a university might still
be unable to justify resort to race-conscious admissions policies to
achieve the diverse student body it seeks. This was the approach
Justice Kennedy, the key swing vote in the public school integration

these cases highlights the general antagonism to race-conscious thinking that has dominated the
thought of the Court’s most vocal opponents of affirmative action. See Jed Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (noting that “the entire set of arguments”
most commonly invoked by the Justices, “both for and against [affirmative action], is in fact
constitutionally irrelevant”).
101. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
102. See id. at 2420 (“Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is
‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.” (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978))).
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103

cases, took in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in
104
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, in which he
supported the educational interests of school districts in achieving
more racially balanced schools, but ruled they must pursue that goal
105
without using race-conscious measures.
In determining how best to interpret Fisher on this threshold raceconscious versus race-neutral point, it is helpful to begin with how the
Court interpreted the Fifth Circuit ruling in the case. The Court found
the Fifth Circuit had wrongly held the University of Texas to a
standard less rigorous than traditional strict scrutiny, requiring only
that the University demonstrate that its decision to reintroduce race
106
as a factor in admissions was made “in good faith.”
This was a fair reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, but by no
means a necessary one. The Fifth Circuit’s legal analysis opened, for
example, with an extensive discussion of the strict scrutiny test it
claimed to be applying, and went out of its way to insist that the rigor
with which strict scrutiny must be applied is no less strict within the
107
special circumstances of higher education. Yet, its invocation of
strict scrutiny did indeed seem watered down by its simultaneous
insistence that the University was entitled to deference in its
judgments, that what Grutter required was simply a good-faith
consideration by the University of race-neutral alternatives, and that
the University was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it had
108
indeed acted in good faith.
103. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
104. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
105. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he idea that if race is the problem,
race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward,”
and that if this seems to frustrate “the Equal Protection Clause[,] it simply reflects the duality of
our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against
it”). The plurality opinion in Parents Involved, written by Chief Justice Roberts, went beyond
Justice Kennedy’s position, adopting what was essentially a colorblind position, ending with the
declaration: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.” Id. at 748 (plurality opinion). That statement echoed a similar expression made
by Professor William Van Alstyne many years earlier. See William Van Alstyne, Rites of
Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809–10 (1979)
(“[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible
commitment never to tolerate in one's own life—or in the life or practices of one's
government—the differential treatment of other human beings by race.”).
106. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
107. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011).
108. Id. at 231–32 (“Rather than second-guess the merits of the University's decision, . . . we
instead scrutinize the University's decisionmaking process to ensure that its decision to adopt a
race-conscious admissions policy followed from the good faith consideration Grutter requires.
We presume the University acted in good faith, [which] Appellants are free to rebut.”)
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The Fifth Circuit cannot be too severely condemned for
superimposing the good faith test, along with a presumption of good
faith, on its strict scrutiny review, for there was in fact language in
Grutter—language drawn from Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke—
seeming to endorse such a test. As Grutter put it:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a
diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a
109
university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”

The Fifth Circuit concluded its analysis by again quoting the standard
articulated in Grutter, holding that “we cannot say that under the
circumstances before us UT breached its obligation to undertake a
‘serious, good faith consideration’ before resorting to race-conscious
110
measures.”
The Fifth Circuit clearly thought it was doing what Grutter
instructed it to do—but the Supreme Court in Fisher was adamant
111
that the Fifth Circuit got Grutter exactly wrong. Strict scrutiny, the
Fisher Court instructed, “does require a court to examine with care,
and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith consideration of
112
workable race-neutral alternatives.’” This enormously important
passage in Fisher, which includes the word “not” smack dab in the
center, turns out to not be in Grutter! The Fisher opinion does
accurately quote Grutter’s use of the phrase “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.” The clear
insistence that courts must not defer to that good-faith consideration
is Fisher’s new invention. It does not come from Grutter. What Grutter
actually said on point is only this: “Narrow tailoring does, however,
require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
113
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”
There is no “not” in that sentence.
The Supreme Court, of course, is master of its own precedents, and
free to adjust those precedents as it deems wise. My point here is
simply this: It would seriously under-read and trivialize Fisher to see
109. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–19 (1978)).
110. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 246.
111. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“[The Fifth Circuit’s] expressions of the controlling standard
are at odds with Grutter’s command . . . .”).
112. Id. at 2420 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339) (emphasis added).
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
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the case as merely reversing and remanding the Fifth Circuit’s
decision for failing to apply the law as laid down in Grutter. The
opinion did much more. Fisher is a deliberate adjustment to Grutter,
an adjustment that goes to the heart of one of Grutter’s analytic
mainstays: its standard of deference to the educational judgments of
universities. That deference, so important to the Powell opinion in
Bakke and the majority opinion of Justice O’Connor in Grutter, has
114
been repudiated in Fisher.
Indeed, the Fisher Court went out of its way to distinguish
between those genuinely academic judgments on which courts
appropriately defer to universities, and those judgments that implicate
115
constitutional standards on which courts must not defer. The Court
in Fisher noted Grutter’s mandate that judges defer to the educational
judgment of university educators regarding the benefits that flow
from a diverse student body: “Grutter concluded that the decision to
pursue ‘the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity,’ that the University deems integral to its mission is, in
substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not
116
complete, judicial deference is proper under Grutter.” Yet after this
bone is tossed, the opinion goes on to recite what the Court really
feels—that universities should not receive the deference to which they
117
had become accustomed.

114. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as
to education includes the selection of its student body.”); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“The
Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is
one to which we defer.”).
115. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
116. Id.
117. The Court immediately limits the amount of deference owed to universities,
emphasizing that “[a] court, of course, should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled
explanation for the academic decision.” Id. It notes that “[t]here is disagreement about whether
Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling
interest in diversity,” and it proceeds to qualify the way a university may define diversity. Id.
(“A university is not permitted to define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’ ‘That would amount to outright racial
balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Bakke, 438
U.S. at 307)).
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Tellingly, on this point, the Supreme Court appeared to be dealing
with two questions of deference—on whether race-conscious
programs are required at all, and on the merits of a particular
program’s actual design:
[Though] a court can take account of a university’s experience and
expertise in adopting or rejecting certain admissions
processes[,] . . . as the Court said in Grutter, it remains at all
times . . . the Judiciary’s obligation to determine[] that admissions
processes “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual
and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the
defining feature of his or her application.” Narrow tailoring also
requires that the reviewing court verify that it is “necessary” for a
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of
118
diversity.

Driving home this point, the Fisher Court instructed that if a raceneutral alternative will accomplish the University’s goals roughly as
well as a race-conscious system, the race-neutral alternative must be
119
chosen.
Perhaps because the Court appreciated that the lower courts in
the litigation and the litigants themselves may have been somewhat
blind-sided by the Court’s abrupt instruction that courts must not
defer to universities’ good-faith judgments that race-based admissions
programs are necessary, the Fisher Court chose to simply remand the
case for further proceedings under its newly-clarified standards. It
observed that “fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the
case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can
120
be considered and judged under a correct analysis.”
That Fisher should be understood as a major shift away from
deference to universities, portending the demise of Grutter, is further
evidenced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Her opinion
was a vigorous defense of both Grutter and the Texas admissions
121
system. What is striking is not that Justice Ginsburg would author
118. Id. at 2419–20 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 337).
119. Id. at 2440 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable raceneutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If ‘a nonracial
approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative
expense,’ . . . then the university may not consider race.” (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986))).
120. Id. at 2421.
121. Justice Ginsburg defended the University’s admissions system, noting that “[t]he
University has steered clear of a quota system like the one struck down in Bakke,” and that “[it]
has taken care to follow the model approved by the Court in Grutter.” Id. at 2432–33 (Ginsburg,
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such a dissent, for her views on the matter are well known. What is
striking—and particularly noteworthy for predicting the future of
race-based admissions programs—is that not a single other Justice on
the Court joined her.
Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent: “Texas’ percentage plan was
adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and schools front and
123
center stage.” To the extent that Fisher’s claim was distilled in the
notion that race-conscious plans were not needed because solutions
such as the Top Ten Percent Law demonstrated how race-neutral
plans would work just as well, Justice Ginsburg argued that “[i]t is
124
race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such plans.”
Further elaborating, Justice Ginsburg chided:
The notion that Texas’ Top Ten Percent Law is race neutral calls to
mind Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s famous statement: “If you
think that you can think about a thing inextricably attached to
something else without thinking of the thing which it is attached to,
125
then you have a legal mind.”

Only such a legal mind, Justice Ginsburg quipped, “could conclude
that an admissions plan specifically designed to produce racial
126
diversity is not race conscious.” Whether one regards Justice
Ginsburg’s point here as persuasive or not, there is surely significance
in the fact that she, and she alone, was willing to make it.

J., dissenting). She advocated for a more faithful application of Grutter, claiming that “[t]he
Court rightly declines to cast off the equal protection framework settled in Grutter . . . . Yet it
stops short of reaching the conclusion that framework warrants.” Id.
122. See id. at 2433 (“I have several times explained why government actors, including state
universities, need not be blind to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past,’ the
legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned inequality.’” (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting))); see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 215 U.S. 200, 273,
374 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Given this history [of racial discrimination] and its
practical consequences, Congress surely can conclude that a carefully designed affirmative
action program may help to realize, finally, the ‘equal protection of the laws’ the Fourteenth
Amendment has promised since 1868.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)).
123. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Many regions of . . . Texas are still
predominantly composed of people from a single racial or ethnic group. Because of [this] . . .
admitting the top 10 percent of all high schools would provide a diverse population and ensure
that a large, well qualified pool of minority students was admitted to Texas universities.”
(citation omitted)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2433 n.2 (citation omitted).
126. Id.
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VI. WHAT HAPPENED TO DEFERENCE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
A. The Loose Invocation of Academic Freedom that Began in Bakke
If the biggest doctrinal casualty in Fisher is the end of deference to
universities on the question of the need for race-conscious affirmative
action measures, what caused the demise of that deference? This
question takes on additional intensity when we consider that in
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and in the Court’s opinion in
Grutter, this deference was informed by notions of academic
127
freedom.
One of the most famous lines from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion
was his homage to academic freedom. Justice Powell began by stating:
“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
128
First Amendment.” Powell did not actually say, of course, that
academic freedom was a freestanding constitutional right guaranteed
in the First Amendment, with distinct content and meaning, different
from the rights of freedom of speech or freedom of assembly that
actually are enumerated in the First Amendment. He instead used the
129
softer phrase—“special concern of the First Amendment.” This
phrasing paralleled Powell’s jurisprudence in an analogous First
Amendment arena, in which he joined a majority opinion rejecting
the claim that journalists enjoyed a special First Amendment
“reporter’s privilege” to maintain the confidentiality of their
130
sources. But he also authored a short and cryptic concurring
131
opinion that some lower courts would interpret as supporting the
132
creation of a qualified reporter’s privilege, and others would treat as
133
meaningless dicta of no formal legal consequence.

127. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (“The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body.”); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
128. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
129. Id.
130. See Branzburg v. Hayes¸ 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
133. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987).
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The loose invocation of academic freedom in Bakke as the basis
for deference to a state university’s decision whether to employ raceconscious admissions programs came back to haunt affirmative action
as laid out in Fisher. When the term “academic freedom” is used
without sufficient legal precision or analytic rigor, it begins to unravel
as an effective legal construct. In the specific context of affirmative
action, the loose invocation of academic freedom tends to paper over
two vexing problems: (1) whether academic freedom is an
institutional right possessed by universities in their corporate sense, or
an individual right possessed by individual actors within the university
134
community, such as professors and students; and (2) whether the
institutional versus individual conundrum turns on whether the
matter at issue arises in the context of a public university or a private
135
university.
B. The Significance of the Dual System of Public and Private Higher
Education
The major higher education affirmative action cases decided by
the Supreme Court—Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and Fisher—all involved
programs at state universities. Yet the decisions also bind most private
136
universities. In thinking about the roles of academic freedom and
deference in the context of affirmative action, it is worth
reconsidering how this parallelism between public and private
institutions with regard to affirmative action came about. Indeed,
looking back over the decades, the failure to account for differences
between the missions and the sheer sizes of public and private
universities may have contributed, at least in part, to the undoing of
affirmative action.

134. See RODNEY SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 17–38 (2011);
David Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom
Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 229 (1990).
135. SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44.
136. Private universities receiving federal funding are bound by the Court’s decisions on the
constitutionality of affirmative action admission policies because the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
discussed infra, mandates that any organization receiving federal funding may not discriminate
on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or religion, thereby extending the constraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment to private parties.
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In Bakke, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
137
Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, reasoned that the Davis
Medical School admissions program was proscribed by a federal
statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which declares: “No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
138
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The four Justices
joining in the Stevens opinion relied on the legislative history of the
Act, including remarks from one if its principal proponents, Senator
Hubert Humphrey, to reach the conclusion that Congress, in passing
Title VI, intended American universities receiving federal funds to be
139
colorblind. It may well have been, these Justices reasoned, that the
proponents of Title VI assumed that the Constitution itself imposed a
140
colorblind standard. But whether Congress was right or wrong in its
assumption as to what the Constitution required, Title VI was a law
standing on its own bottom, imposing a prohibition by its own force,
and if Congress enacted a colorblind law (even if it did so because it
felt it had no choice), then Congress had enacted a colorblind law.
These four Justices thus did not reach the question of whether, under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Medical School’s affirmative action
141
program was unconstitutional. Title VI was enough to do the trick.
At the other end of the spectrum in Bakke, Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun voted to uphold the Medical School’s
142
admissions program. Responding to Justice Stevens, they reasoned
that in passing Title VI, Congress sought only to deny federal money
to universities that engaged in discrimination that violated the
143
Constitution.
Title VI, in their view, merely mimicked the
constitutional standard, whatever it might be, and if the Medical
School program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, by
144
definition it did not violate Title VI. Then, turning to the
constitutional issue, those four Justices distinguished between the
“benign” and “invidious” use of race, holding that benign racial
137. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
138. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2013).
139. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 415–16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 416.
141. Id. at 411–12, 421.
142. Id. at 325–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 328.
144. Id. at 353.
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classifications—those seeking to assist groups that had historically
been victims of discrimination—should be judged under a more
145
lenient “intermediate scrutiny” standard. Applying intermediate
scrutiny, they would have upheld the Medical School program,
reasoning that government “may take race into account when it acts
not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages
146
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.”
Justice Powell supplied the key fifth vote on this issue—agreeing
with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman that Title VI
147
and the Constitution were coextensive. This was one of the few
load-bearing legal propositions in Bakke that actually commanded a
five-Justice majority in the case. And now in 2013, it may be the only
legal proposition in Bakke that remains, at least for the time being,
148
unthreatened as good law. Though it might have seemed a
subordinate point at the time—noisome legal underbrush to be
cleared away by the five Justices who wanted to reach the weighty
constitutional question posed by affirmative action—the decision that
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause are coextensive has
significant practical consequences for higher education in America,
putting virtually all public and private universities on the same plane
when it comes to the use of race in admissions. Only the very rare
bird—the exceptionally independent school that refuses to accept
federal aid at all—is out from under the national legal standard.
Unlike some other aspects relating to the values and identity of
universities, in which private schools are free to engage in practices
not permitted for public schools, when it comes to race, one size must
fit more-or-less all. Private universities, for example, even those
receiving federal aid, may remain exclusively female, or exclusively
149
male, and a few still do. And private universities, even those
receiving federal aid, may choose to be overtly religious in their

145. Id. at 359.
146. Id. at 325.
147. Id. at 287 (plurality opinion).
148. See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Salem State Univ.,
No. 11-10748-DJC, 2013 WL 3404331, at *6 (D. Mass. July 2, 2013); Davis v. City of New York,
No. 10 Civ. 0699(SAS), 2013 WL 1288176, at *21 n.210 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013); Aguirre v. San
Leandro Police Dep’t, No. 10-04364 CW, 2011 WL 738292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011).
149. The Supreme Court has yet to address the status of private single-sex education. See
Respondents' Brief at 35–36, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 942107) (explaining that “[t]he unconstitutionality of the MUW women-only admissions policy
invalidated in Hogan does not affect the continued legality of private single-sex education”).

SMOLLA 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHO PUT THE HOLES IN “HOLISTIC”?

2/15/2014 2:49 PM

59

150

mission and programming.
But when it comes to race and
affirmative action policies, Bakke held and still holds that public and
private schools must behave the same.
This linkage between the admissions programs of private and
public universities was not merely legal, in the sense that five Justices
in Bakke used Title VI to create a unifying bridge, putting private and
public schools on a formal legal par. The linkage went deeper than
that. Justice Powell held up as a constitutionally approved admissions
model the lofty ideals behind the admissions programs of elite private
universities, as exemplars of what the public universities should be
151
doing. An amicus brief submitted by Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania,
for example, proved to be among the most frequently cited sources in
152
Justice Powell’s opinion, along with quotations from the President
153
and a wholesale reproduction of the Harvard
of Princeton,
154
Admissions program in its Appendix. This conflation of public and
private universities may not have appeared like much at the time—
and indeed, it seemed to go largely unnoticed. With the benefit of
decades of hindsight, however, it may have been a contributing cause
to the slow unraveling of the holistic admissions affirmative action
ideal.
In accepting the pursuit of diversity as a compelling governmental
interest, Justice Powell again conflated the world of private
universities with the world of public universities, treating notions of
institutional academic freedom as essentially identical for private and
155
public schools alike. This loose use of the phrase “academic
freedom” as a justification for judicial deference to the academic
judgment of educators was, as a strict matter of constitutional
doctrine, conceptually unsound from the beginning, and would prove,
as I hope to demonstrate later, to be yet another contributing factor
to the demise of affirmative action.

150. See generally Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
151. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316–17 (citing Appendix to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University and the University of Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae at 2–3,
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811)).
152. Id. at 317.
153. Id. at 314 n.48.
154. Id. at 321–24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
155. See id. at 311–12.
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At its core, the great conceptual oversight in Justice Powell’s
invocation of academic freedom in Bakke was his failure to grapple
with the fundamental constitutional divide between public and
private actors. It is conceptually coherent to speak of academic
freedom as a constitutional right possessed by universities as
156
institutions if they are private. Duke University, a private institution,
certainly possesses rights of institutional autonomy derived from the
First Amendment that it may assert against governments—against the
City of Durham, the State of North Carolina, or the United States.
Current First Amendment doctrine suggests that these rights are not
so much distinct, free-standing First Amendment freedoms with
content over and above Duke’s rights of free speech or association,
but are instead derivative of those established rights, translations of
the meaning and application of those rights in the context of private
157
higher education. Individuals within Duke—professors or students
on the campus—by contrast, have no First Amendment academic
freedom rights they may assert against Duke itself, because Duke is
not a state actor and is not bound by the First Amendment. Though
Duke faculty and students may well possess some enforceable legal
entitlements to academic freedom, the legal source of those
entitlements will essentially derive from the law of contracts, as
informed by Duke’s key documents (bylaws, regulations, handbooks,
158
and the like), practices, and customs.
A few miles down the road, at the University of North Carolina,
the pattern is reversed. Now it becomes incoherent to speak of the
University of North Carolina as possessing First Amendment rights as
an institution. This is an issue that has been litigated with special
intensity in Michigan, in which the question posed was whether
Michigan’s state universities possessed constitutionally enforceable
159
rights against the State of Michigan itself. To the extent that such
rights are described as First Amendment rights enforceable by, say,
the University of Michigan against the State of Michigan, the claim at
its core must be unsound. For surely the University of Michigan or the

156. SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44.
157. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v.
Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
158. SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44.
159. See Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 594 N.W.2d 491, 498
(Mich. 1999); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 431 N.W.2d
217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773, 777–78
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988).

SMOLLA 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHO PUT THE HOLES IN “HOLISTIC”?

2/15/2014 2:49 PM

61

University of North Carolina, themselves state agencies and creatures
of their states, cannot have First Amendment rights enforceable
against the very state entities that created them. Again in contrast to
the world of private universities, it is sound to treat the individual
actors at public institutions as possessing constitutional rights,
including First Amendment rights, which may be asserted against their
state universities.
What this discussion reveals is that when a state university, such as
the University of California, the University of Michigan, or the
University of Texas, invokes “academic freedom” as a First
Amendment right to buttress the institution’s defense of affirmative
action, it is talking legal gibberish. A private university, in contrast,
could plausibly interpose a First Amendment entitlement to shape its
own student body as it deems fit as a defense to a federal statute
interpreted as requiring colorblind admissions.
To the extent that a state university might assert an entitlement to
deference by courts regarding its educational judgments, that
entitlement to deference resides not in the First Amendment, but in
structural conceptions of separations of powers and federalism. In
Fisher, for example, the State of Texas as a sovereign within the
federal system is certainly entitled to some respect and deference in
deciding for itself how best to shape its state system of higher
160
education, including the character and identity of its student bodies.
Once that deference is conceptualized as an incident to federalism,
however, and not the First Amendment, its force is diminished. And
the force is diminished because of yet another fundamental precept of
constitutional law—that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment stands as an explicit and powerful constraint
on federalism and “state’s rights” in all matters germane to
161
classifications based on race.

160. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
161. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472 (1989) (“[Section] 1 of the
Amendment, which includes the Equal Protection Clause, is an explicit constraint upon the
power of States and political subdivisions, which must undertake any remedial efforts in
accordance with the dictates of that section.”).

SMOLLA 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

62

2/15/2014 2:49 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9

162

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, which was
placed on the Supreme Court docket for the October 2013 term, will
test these propositions. Schuette raises the question of whether
Michigan voters may ban affirmative action in admissions at the
163
state’s public universities. A deeply divided lower court ruled that
even though affirmative action in university admissions is presently
deemed constitutional, but not constitutionally required, the Michigan
electorate, in adopting a preemptive statewide ban on racial
preferences in admissions, nonetheless violated equal protection
principles by removing from state university boards, administrators,
and faculty the power they traditionally possessed to set admissions
164
policies. The Supreme Court in Schuette will have the opportunity to
clarify the principles explored here, including whether a state
university has any federal constitutional entitlement to resist the
policy choices imposed upon it by the state itself.
C. The Role of Size and Scale
Yet another practical aspect of the conflation of public and private
universities with regard to affirmative action law and policy is that it
is indifferent to issues of size and scale. On a simple, pragmatic level,
when it comes to admissions, size and scale matter. Smaller
universities, or smaller units within universities (such as law schools),
have a much easier time implementing a genuinely holistic approach
to admissions than larger ones. Giant state university systems, or
individual state university campuses with tens of thousands of
students, will often feel hydraulic pressure to automate more of the
admissions process.
The University of Michigan Law School in Grutter was able to
make a winning case in the Supreme Court that its approach to
admissions was sufficiently “Harvard-like” to meet the standard
165
Justice Powell had held up as permissible in Bakke. The University
of Michigan undergraduate admissions program, which relied on a
more mechanical point system for admissions, by contrast looked
more like a quota—preference of race for its own sake—which Powell
166
had found offensive in Bakke. But surely the differences in the two
162. 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
163. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
No. 12-682 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2012).
164. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2012).
165. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
166. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003).
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systems at the same University in Ann Arbor were not attributable to
the Michigan Law School’s superior virtue or understanding of
constitutional law (notwithstanding that it was the law school).
Rather, the difference, in large part, was a product of the sheer
difference in scale—and in turn, the different challenges admissions
departments face in providing authentically individualized
consideration to all candidates in the applicant pool of a law school
versus the applicant pool of a major state undergraduate program.
Indeed, in Gratz the University of Michigan made exactly this
argument, claiming that it was simply not practical for it to employ an
167
individualized approach to holistic admissions. But under Gratz, this
mere administrative inconvenience is not, as a matter of law, a
sufficient justification for adopting race-conscious admissions
168
programs that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
While the remand ordered by the Supreme Court in Fisher
proceeds and the Fisher case moves through the next stages of
litigation, a broader, more figurative “remand” will also proceed, as all
of us in American higher education consider what we will do if, as the
analysis above suggests, race-conscious affirmative action programs as
169
we have known them are not long for this world.
If race-conscious affirmative action programs come to be
eliminated entirely, or are severely curtailed, does that mean
American universities should abandon admissions policies that are
“holistic”? In my view, the answer must be “No!” There are great
benefits to holistic admissions programs, even when stripped of any
consideration of race or ethnicity. Our system of higher education, our
very constitutional democracy, is strengthened by university
admissions policies that are not single-mindedly driven by academic
numbers, such as test scores, grade point averages, or Advanced

167. Id. at 275.
168. Id. (“[T]he fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does not render
constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”).
169. This introspection may force more transparency with regard to what diversity really
means in the day-to-day decisionmaking of admissions officials in higher education. See Devon
Carbardo, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1181–82 (2013) (“When a school says it
is committed to diversity, few stop to ask precisely what that actually means. . . . Deference to
expert decisionmakers is often rational. But should we not have a better sense of what is going
on behind the closed door of admissions?”).

SMOLLA 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

64

2/15/2014 2:49 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9

Placement courses. Qualities of character, including leadership,
altruism, civic engagement, public service, passion for social justice,
creativity, entrepreneurial spirit, resiliency, drive, ambition, the
capacity to overcome adversity—all the polymath possibilities that
might comprise true grit—should also matter. These are factors
resonant in their connection to our most enduring renditions of the
170
American dream. If those of us in higher education pick up our
marbles, leave the game, and pout, abandoning holistic admissions
because the law evolves to require race-neutral alternatives, we will
have to ask ourselves, poignantly, who really put the “holes in
holistic”?
If time proves me right, and courts do in fact build on Fisher to
effectively end race-conscious affirmative action programs, we may
predict a cacophony of shrill critics claiming that the judiciary has
inflicted on the nation a grievous wound, forcing the premature
demise of a holistic approach to admissions that has served the
country passably well, and pragmatically, is still needed. Yet what if
those of us in higher education were to take a truth serum, and
engage in our own candid introspective strict scrutiny, asking
ourselves, who actually caused the demise of the holistic approach?
Might we not be haunted by the suggestion of Queen Gertrude in
171
Hamlet, that it is we who “doth protest too much”? Might we not
reach the troubling judgment that in our often numbers-driven
obsession to serve the two masters of elevating the objective
academic credentials of our students and enhancing the statistical
diversity profiles of our student bodies, when we ask, really, who put
the holes in holistic, the uncomfortable answer just might be: we did.
Affirmative action in admissions in American higher education
may be on its way out in part because the ideal of a genuinely holistic
approach to admissions has not been matched by the realities of
admissions programs in practice at many universities. As with so many
human enterprises, the reality on the ground is not as pure or pleasing
as the lofty ideal considered as an abstraction. The walk does not
entirely match the talk. That dissonance has contributed to a gap in
trust and credibility between many of the leading institutions in

170. Rodney Smolla, The Legal Future of Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (June
27,
2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/06/27/essay-meaning-supreme-courtruling-affirmative-action.
171. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, l. 179 (W. J. Craig. ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1914) (1600).
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higher education and leaders in American politics, culture, and, most
critically for legal purposes, the judiciary. Now we must walk the
walk—though after Fisher, down a new path.
I have no doubt that the many superb educators who crafted the
admissions policies for the University of Texas acted exactly as the
Fifth Circuit described, with the utmost good faith and with the
highest hopes for all the students of that great University in their
pursuit of their dreams. We now know, however, that such good faith
is not enough, and it will be incumbent on those of us in higher
education to obey the evolving law of the land, and to craft policies
that enhance diversity in ways that will remain constitutionally
permissible—policies sufficiently holistic to continue to provide broad
access to the promise of the nation’s rich tapestry of public and
private education.

